The Reduction of Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence from Transfer Pricing Policy by Whitford, Andrew B
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 55 
Number 1 Tributes to Jeffrey E. Lewis, Dean 
Emeritus and Professor of Law (Fall 2010) 
Article 13 
2010 
The Reduction of Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence from Transfer 
Pricing Policy 
Andrew B. Whitford 
University of Georgia, aw@uga.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew B. Whitford, The Reduction of Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence from Transfer Pricing Policy, 55 
St. Louis U. L.J. (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol55/iss1/13 
This Critical Issues in Comparative & International Taxation is brought to you for free and open access by 
Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
269 
THE REDUCTION OF REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY: 
EVIDENCE FROM TRANSFER PRICING POLICY 
ANDREW B. WHITFORD* 
INTRODUCTION 
A number of recent studies have centered on regulatory uncertainty as a 
concern for those worried about how government intervenes in the economy.1  
Likewise, studies in finance and economics show that firms and investors do 
(or that they should) account for regulatory uncertainty when maximizing 
gains or managing share value in markets.2  Both streams of research see the 
regulatory state as part of the firms’ external environment for which firms must 
account when making capital investments or deciding whether to enter 
markets.3  A long literature in management studies presumes that firms 
strategically adapt to regulatory uncertainty and that they try to use public 
policy to shape that environment.4  Recently, business leaders have focused on 
 
* Professor of Public Administration and Policy, School of Public & International Affairs, the 
University of Georgia. 
 1. Leisha DeHart-Davis & Barry Bozeman, Regulatory Compliance and Air Quality 
Permitting: Why Do Firms Overcomply?, 11 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 471 (2001); Chris 
Koski & Peter J. May, Interests and Implementation: Fostering Voluntary Regulatory Actions, 16 
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 329 (2005); Alan L. Olmstead & Paul W. Rhode, The 
“Tuberculosis Cattle Trust”: Disease Contagion in an Era of Regulatory Uncertainty, 64 J. 
ECON. HIST. 929 (2004). 
 2. George Bittlingmayer, Regulatory Uncertainty and Investment: Evidence from Antitrust 
Enforcement, 20 CATO J. 295 (2001); Roger Buckland & Patricia Fraser, Political and Regulatory 
Risk: Beta Sensitivity in U.K. Electricity Distribution, 19 J. REG. ECON. 5 (2001); E.R. Larsen & 
D.W. Bunn, Deregulation in Electricity: Understanding Strategic and Regulatory Risk, 50 J. 
OPERATIONAL RES. SOC’Y 337 (1999); Claudio Morana & John W. Sawkins, Regulatory 
Uncertainty and Share Price Volatility: the English and Welsh Water Industry’s Periodic Price 
Review, 17 J. REG. ECON. 87 (2000). 
 3. See sources cited supra notes 1–2. 
 4. Philip H. Birnbaum, The Choice of Strategic Alternatives Under Increasing Regulation 
in High Technology Companies, 27 ACAD. MGMT. J. 489 (1984); Nancy M. Carter, Small Firm 
Adaptation: Responses of Physicians’ Organizations to Regulatory and Competitive Uncertainty, 
33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 307 (1990); Brian Shaffer, Firm-level Responses to Government Regulation: 
Theoretical and Research Approaches, 21 J. MGMT. 495 (1995). 
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regulatory uncertainty and risk as a key decision environment—one that can 
make or break both companies and their leaders.5 
One reason that firms focus on regulatory uncertainty or risk is that capital 
investment decisions are long-term decisions.6  Firms seek to evaluate the size, 
timing, and risk of future cash flows.7  In the end, efficient investment depends 
on the manager’s ability to distinguish between investment opportunities and 
the manager’s investment incentives.8  While having developed financial 
markets seems to improve the allocation of capital,9 business investment is 
unpredictable and difficult to explain.10  In practice, many of the key financial 
factors still leave a great deal of variation in investment unexplained.11  Studies 
in economics and finance see regulatory uncertainty and risk as a major source 
of that variation.12 
I focus in this paper on the conditions under which governments seek to 
reduce regulatory uncertainty.  Regulatory uncertainty and regulatory risk are 
states of the world that governments might seek to mitigate.  This paper 
concentrates on multinational companies (MNCs) that seek to transfer goods 
and services across international borders.  Multidivisional firms often use 
pricing systems for the transfer of such goods and services; this coordination 
mechanism can be problematic when divisions engage in cross-border 
transactions, if governments regulate the flow of taxable revenue across 
borders.13  As a recent report of PricewaterhouseCoopers noted: 
A major and growing problem for the directors of multinationals is the issue of 
preparing documentation to demonstrate compliance with transfer pricing 
rules.  More and more countries have established documentation rules that 
 
 5. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE ECONOMIST, REGULATORY RISK: TRENDS AND 
STRATEGIES FOR THE CRO 2 (2005), available at http://www.aceeuropeangroup.com/NR/ 
rdonlyres/9602658F-7C1C-4169-AEA5-E207EEA2CA21/0/CRO_RISK_REPORT.pdf. 
 6. See Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Capital Investment Strategies Under Uncertain 
Regulation, 24 RAND J. ECON. 591, 593 (1993). 
 7. See generally STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1996) 
(outlining procedures for evaluating future cash flows). 
 8. See Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 
187, 187–89 (2000) (arguing that agency theories suggest “pressures from external investors, as 
well as managerial ownership, encourage managers to pursue value-maximizing investment 
policies,” but that when the resources are owned by the state, political motivations and infrequent 
checks in the system do not encourage managers to work towards efficiency). 
 9. Id. at 198. 
 10. Murray Z. Frank & Vidhan K. Goyal, Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors Are 
Reliably Important?, 38 FIN. MGMT. 1, 2–5 (2009). 
 11. Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 295. 
 12. Donald P. Morgan, Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry, 92 AM. 
ECON. REV. 874, 881 (2002). 
 13. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING 2008 1 (2008), 
available at http://pwccn.com/webmedia/doc/633542361212701566_tp_intl_2008.pdf. 
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require companies to state clearly and with supporting evidence why their 
transfer pricing policies comply with the arm’s-length standard.14 
Predictably, firms face significant uncertainty about how governments view 
these transactions, a typical standard being whether the price is consistent with 
an arm’s length transaction (with the price that would be consistent left 
unstated).15  The economics literature on transfer pricing is usually technical in 
nature,16 yet the applied literature (written from the perspective of top 
accounting firms) mostly concerns how firms can reduce regulatory risk.17 
Specifically, I address the conditions under which countries reduce firm 
uncertainty over how tax authorities regulate future transactions.  Some 
countries adopt “Advance Pricing Agreements” or “Advance Pricing 
Arrangements” (APAs) providing for agreements between a taxpayer and the 
tax authority that a range of prices will be recognized as “arm’s length”;18 
APAs reduce the risks that firms will be assessed future payments.19  This 
paper empirically assesses the choice by countries to limit this type of 
regulatory uncertainty, and thus, fills a gap in the literature from political 
science, economics, and management.  No known study addresses the 
conditions under which countries will reduce regulatory uncertainty; this paper 
is the first to address the underlying mechanisms that support government 
choices to limit this uncertainty. 
Using data from 2005, I observe the dependent variable of whether a 
country’s tax authority is authorized to negotiate binding APAs.20  I model this 
policy adoption as a function of the country’s legal origins, the structure of the 
tax regime and its impact on government revenues, the country’s participation 
in the international Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), and the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) both into and out of 
the country.  I account for limitations in my sample and the limited nature of 
my dependent variable by first estimating a logit model and then assessing the 
 
 14. Id. at ii. 
 15. Id. at 1, 4. 
 16. See Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Taxes, Tariffs and Transfer Pricing in Multinational 
Corporate Decision Making, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 285, 285 (1991) (addressing corporate 
decision making by examining 1982 data from thirty-three countries); Jack Hirshleifer, On the 
Economics of Transfer Pricing, 29 J. BUS. 172, 172 (1956) (arguing that market price is the 
correct transfer price only where the product being transferred is produced in a competitive 
environment). 
 17. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, at 1. 
 18. Id. at viii. 
 19. Diane M. Ring, On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advance Pricing Agreements 
and the Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143, 165–66 
(2000). 
 20. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, KMPG INT’L, GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING 
REVIEW 2–4 (2005), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~bodnarg/courses/readings/ 
KPMGGlobalTransferPricingReview_2005.pdf. 
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model’s robustness using a trimming estimator for the linear probability 
model.21 
The analysis first demonstrates that both inward and outward FDI flows 
increase the likelihood of a country adopting an APA and thus reducing 
regulatory uncertainty.  However, I also find that the impact of FDI flows out 
of the country is substantially greater than those into the country.  Second, I 
find that countries are more likely to reduce regulatory uncertainty by adopting 
an APA mechanism when they have high corporate tax rates; the impact of 
corporate tax rates is also substantially higher than that for inward FDI flows.  
While my results initially appear to support the finding that OECD countries 
are less likely to offer the APA mechanism, the trimming estimator shows that 
this result is not robust.  In contrast to the broad literature on endogenous 
growth theory and new political economy,22 I find no evidence that countries 
with English legal origins are more likely to offer the APA mechanism to 
countries facing regulation of their transfer pricing practices. 
In the next section, I offer a short description of the causal story about why 
countries try to reduce regulatory uncertainty through the use of APA-like 
mechanisms.  In the third section, I provide a longer description of how 
transfer pricing and APAs solve specific problems for firms trying to manage 
their taxes.  I then present my hypotheses and model specification.  After that, I 
discuss the estimation strategy and the results from the statistical analysis.  
Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings for the study of regulatory 
uncertainty, case, and test. 
I.  REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY AS A CONCERN OF FIRMS 
One broadly overlooked aspect of the modern regulatory state is its ability 
to limit or expand the uncertainty that firms face when they compete in market 
environments.  The modern state has evolved to the point where its institutions 
can shape fundamental decisions23—not just how to produce goods and 
services or how to employ labor and distribute the benefits of production, but 
even whether to produce at all.  Firms make fundamental capital investment 
decisions, such as where to invest, how much to invest, and where to locate 
facilities.  These capital investment decisions are often made on the basis of 
 
 21. William C. Horrace & Ronald L. Oaxaca, Results on the Bias and Inconsistency of 
Ordinary Least Squares for the Linear Probability Model, 90 ECON. LETTERS 321, 321–22 
(2006). 
 22. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131 
(1997) [hereinafter Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants]; Rafael La Porta et al., The 
Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222, 222–24 (1999) [hereinafter Rafael La Porta et 
al., Quality of Government]. 
 23. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 3 (James Alt & Douglass C. North eds., Cambridge Ser., Political Econ. of 
Institutions & Decisions, 1991). 
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sound business fundamentals: the cost of investment, the demand for their 
goods, and investors’ demand for assets.  For example, firms may expand 
capital investment if low interest rates indicate a lower cost of investment and, 
thus, higher expected returns, if strong demand suggests greater profits or if 
investors have a greater taste for particular sectors’ investment opportunities.24  
Sound fundamentals (or at least the broader business environment) help 
determine whether businesses go down this road. 
At the same time, firms worldwide regularly make decisions under varying 
conditions of political uncertainty: How secure are property rights?  Are 
contracts enforceable?  How difficult is it to repatriate profits or shift currency 
given changes in national monetary policy?  The credibility of these political 
institutions fundamentally shapes the ability of firms to make capital 
investment decisions, and accordingly, for developing economies to grow and 
flourish.25 
Similarly, firms face significant regulatory uncertainty when aspects of 
regulatory or taxation policy lower investment returns, or at least make it 
difficult to set expectations about what those returns will be.26  Regulatory 
uncertainty may come in the form of variations in antitrust policy with changes 
in administration27 or environmental policy due to changes in social tastes for 
protection.28  This paper centers on a second type of regulatory uncertainty: 
when the state, through taxation policy, tries to shape how firms distribute their 
profits.  Firms make capital investment decisions based in part on profit 
expectations; states construct tax policies in part on their expectations of how 
those profits will be distributed.  With this knowledge, firms can make choices 
to reduce that tax burden.  In turn, states can adapt their policies to reflect 
firms’ minimization efforts.  In the end, regulatory uncertainty comes to rank 
with other business factors in shaping how firms allocate goods and services 
across multiple markets. 
Political uncertainty poses significant risk to business investments on many 
levels.  “In extreme cases, a shift in the political climate will threaten property 
rights, the enforceability of contracts, the repatriation of profits, and the 
integrity of the monetary standard.”29  While the political environment in the 
 
 24. Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 295. 
 25. See NORTH, supra note 23, at 8 (arguing that the structure created by the Constitution 
and the Northwest Ordinance encouraged investment in early America); Douglass C. North & 
Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing 
Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 810–11 (1989) 
(describing how the monarchy’s system of forced loans, uncertain repayment schedules, and 
grants of monopoly discouraged new investment in the late 1600s). 
 26. See Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 312. 
 27. Id. at 298. 
 28. Koski & May, supra note 1, at 332. 
 29. Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 295–96. 
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United States has been relatively stable, shifts in the regulatory framework and 
environmental and labor law have affected investments.30 
Although the idea of political uncertainty affecting the business climate is 
highly intriguing, it has been largely ignored in business cycle literature.31  
Mainly because of the difficulty in measuring uncertainty, the concept of 
uncertainty affecting investment has generated very little empirical work.32  
One significant example of a paper in this area is George Bittlingmayer’s 
“Regulatory Uncertainty and Investment: Evidence from Antitrust 
Enforcement.”33  This paper uses antitrust enforcement as a measure of policy 
uncertainty by focusing on the background of United States antitrust 
enforcement in the twentieth century.34  Antitrust enforcement often has a 
significant political component, so it offers a possible measure of uncertainty-
causing economic policy.35  Bittlingmayer presents the links between 
investment and antitrust at three levels: certainty, a stable switch in antitrust 
policy, and the effects of increased enforcement on uncertainty.36  Antitrust is a 
relatively easily measured signal for a broader spectrum of business regulation.  
He uses data for twenty-one major industry groups over the period 1947–1991 
with plant and equipment investment, GDP, and case filings against exchange-
listed firms.37  Bittlingmayer’s “statistical results are based on a version of 
widely used investment models, augmented with measures of antitrust 
enforcement.”38  “[T]he results support the view that major changes in 
[antitrust] policy provide a laboratory to study its effects.”39  One actual effect 
of antitrust in practice is to limit investment.40  However, since periods of 
antitrust enforcement often coincide with increases in government and business 
conflict, antitrust enforcement acts as a signal rather than an isolated variable.41 
Few research studies have assessed the importance of regulatory 
uncertainty, although it is key to understanding today’s global business 
environment.  It may be desirable to restrict regulatory commitment power to 
prevent a dishonest regulator from causing long-term harm, but that does not 
tell us how variations in expectations about honest behavior by regulators 
 
 30. Id. at 296 
 31. Id. at 295–96. 
 32. Id. at 296. 
 33. Id. at 295. 
 34. Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 296–97. 
 35. Id. at 295. 
 36. Id. at 309. 
 37. Id. at 298. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 322. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 297. 
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affect firm decisions and performance.42  It is possible to address regulatory 
uncertainty from a comparative institutional analysis perspective by focusing 
on the means for restraining regulatory discretion in the context of particular 
countries’ political systems,43 but that does not help us understand the 
conditions under which most political systems try to reduce uncertainty.  For 
instance, while one important study uses regulatory decision data to infer the 
regulator’s implicit preferences,44 we have little understanding about how 
uncertainty about those preferences can affect the behavior of firms.  Likewise, 
while a real-options model of investment by a regulated firm shows that 
regulatory uncertainty has a considerable impact on investment decisions, that 
type of evidence is largely drawn from a theoretical model about the behavior 
of firms in markets.45  Finally, while even in the United States there are 
reputational spillovers within a given regulatory jurisdiction,46 we still lack 
detailed knowledge about rules that reduce uncertainty and the conditions 
under which they emerge.47 
In contrast, while there is relatively little literature on regulatory 
uncertainty, there is a vast array of regulatory literature on regulatory capture, 
regulatory opportunism, and multiple firm regulation.  It is clear that one 
primary source of regulatory uncertainty is the possibility of regulators using 
their positions of authority to favor one firm over another.48  Future 
employment opportunities within the regulated industry may influence 
 
 42. See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Should Governments Commit?, 36 EUR. ECON. 
REV. 345, 347, 352–53 (1992) (empirically examining the role of corrupt versus non-corrupt 
government officials as corporate regulators and evaluating how that affects government 
incentives). 
 43. See DAVID G. NEWBERY, PRIVATIZATION, RESTRUCTURING, AND REGULATION OF 
NETWORK UTILITIES: THE WALRAS-PARETO LECTURES 22–23 (2d prtg. 2000) (comparing 
regulation of public utilities in Britain and the United States in the latter half of the twentieth 
century and speculating on the political causes of the differences between the two countries). 
 44. See Daniel McFadden, The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: 
Empirical Evidence, 7 BELL J. ECON. 55, 56 (1976); Daniel McFadden, The Revealed 
Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Theory, 6 BELL J. ECON. 401, 402 (1975). 
 45. See Teisberg, supra note 6, at 592 (theorizing about factors that go into utilities’ 
decision-making process). 
 46. See Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Mayo, Regulatory Opportunism and Investment 
Behavior: Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Industry, 36 RAND J. ECON. 628, 629–30 
(2005) (describing conflicting reports of reputational spillovers as a response to hindsight 
regulation in energy utilities). 
 47. Thomas P. Lyon & Jing Li, Regulatory Uncertainty and Regulatory Scope 1, 3 (July 11, 
2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of Michigan), available at http://web 
user.bus.umich.edu/tplyon/Lyon%20and%20Li%20Regulatory%20Uncertainty.pdf. 
 48. See David Martimort, The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and 
Transaction Costs, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 929, 930–31 (1999). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
276 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:269 
regulators’ decisions.49  The regulator tends to become more fully captured 
over time,50 although competition between two regulators with overlapping 
responsibilities can deter regulatory capture.51  Even so, firms are uncertain of 
the regulators’ preferences and focus on the danger of regulators catering to 
consumer interests,52 mostly because regulators may emphasize consumer 
interests, and this “regulatory opportunism may undermine investment by 
regulated firms over time.”53  Individual regulatory bodies may vary in relative 
allegiance to consumer interests compared to those in the regulated industry.54 
In summary, the purpose of this paper is to assess the way in which 
governments try to limit a specific type of broad political uncertainty.  Broad 
political uncertainty could involve the existence and enforcement of property 
rights and contracts, the repatriation of profits, or even monetary policy.55  This 
paper centers on how governments might limit different types of regulatory 
uncertainty, which might be experienced by firms in the taxation of corporate 
income, assets, or profits, and how that taxation could lower investment 
returns.  Knowing that this can occur, firms can make choices to reduce that 
tax burden.  Governments may adopt rules to reduce that uncertainty.  One 
type of rule is a credible commitment to not act in ways that are detrimental to 
firms—essentially a tying of one’s hands.56  In the next section, I turn to a 
discussion of transfer pricing as a specific legal environment in which 
governments might seek to reduce the concern firms have about regulatory 
uncertainty. 
II.  TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
The purpose of this section is to describe transfer pricing and its place in a 
system of international commerce populated by MNCs.  The literature in this 
area is detailed and complex, so I limit the description here to discussions of 
transfer pricing as a general business strategy, the consequences of that 
 
 49. Yeon-Koo Che, Revolving Doors and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion, 26 
RAND J. ECON. 378, 379 (1995). 
 50. Martimort, supra note 48, at 930–31. 
 51. See Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, Separation of Regulators Against 
Collusive Behavior, 30 RAND J. ECON. 232, 233–35, 257 (1999). 
 52. Lyon & Li, supra note 47, at 30. 
 53. Id.  See also Richard J. Gilbert & David M. Newbery, The Dynamic Efficiency of 
Regulatory Constitutions, 25 RAND J. ECON. 538, 538–39 (1994) (discussing the efficacy of 
‘used and useful’ standard in determining whether consumers should pay for capital investment 
for utilities); David J. Salant & Glenn A. Woroch, Trigger Price Regulation, 23 RAND J. ECON. 
29, 29 (1992) (examining the notion that returns on regulatory investments are subject to 
opportunistic behavior). 
 54. Lyon & Li, supra note 47, at 31. 
 55. Bittlingmayer, supra note 2, at 295–96. 
 56. See Laffont & Tirole, supra note 42, at 346. 
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strategy for tax revenue collection, the debate over various methods of pricing, 
and the evolution of APAs as a way to reduce regulatory uncertainty about the 
tax treatment of future transactions within a MNC. 
Generally, transfer pricing is a core business procedure for MNCs that 
operate across borders.  Transfer pricing has economic, accounting, and 
structural aspects.  The esoteric issue of transfer pricing policies of foreign 
MNCs was an important issue during the 1992 presidential campaign as 
candidates debated whether foreign MNCs pay their fair share of taxes.57  Yet, 
such sentiment is not limited to the presidential sphere.  In July 1992, Dan 
Bucks of the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) testified that the practice of 
transfer pricing costs the states and the federal government roughly $37 billion 
per year in lost revenue.58  J.J. Pickle, as Chairman of the House Ways and 
Means Oversight Subcommittee, argued that transfer pricing abuses led to 
seventy percent of foreign MNCs paying no tax in the United States.59  While 
countries often use a specific method based on the arm’s length principle, 
many services and intangible assets are difficult to estimate, which leaves a lot 
of room for tax manipulation;60 some think transfer pricing manipulation 
problems are growing larger and becoming more prevalent.61 
It is important to see how transfer pricing is a consequence of the evolution 
of an organizational form that spans international borders.  Early forms of the 
European MNC operated in the United States prior to 1914; United States 
MNCs began producing in Europe in the late 1950s and 1960s.62  It is now 
common to talk about the effect of MNCs on the culture and operation of 
international commerce, but we want to recognize that the kinds of 
organizational cultures represented in these organizations result from the 
employees’ professional backgrounds and values developed over time in such 
organizations.63  Moreover, there is not just one operating organizational 
 
 57. See Claudio M. Radaelli, Game Theory and Institutional Entrepreneurship: Transfer 
Pricing and the Search for Coordination in International Tax Policy, 26 POL’Y STUD. J. 603, 610 
(1998). 
 58. Catherine Hubbard, Transfer Pricing Siphons Billions in Revenues, MTC Official 
Charges, 56 TAX NOTES 546, 546 (1992). 
 59. John Turro, Treasury Blasted Over Alleged Transfer Pricing Shenanigans, 55 TAX 
NOTES 150, 150–51 (1992). 
 60. See Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of 
Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 18 (1993). 
 61. Yura Sakurai, Comparing Cross-Cultural Regulatory Styles and Processes in Dealing 
with Transfer Pricing, 30 INT’L J. SOC. L. 173, 174 (2002). 
 62. See John Cantwell, The Changing Form of Multinational Enterprise Expansion in the 
Twentieth Century, in HISTORICAL STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BUSINESS 15, 24 
(Alice Teichova et al. eds., 1989). 
 63. B. GUY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 17 
(1991). 
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culture for all MNCs, because culture is itself not a unitary concept.64  
Essentially, the operation of these companies is diverse and varied, so the 
following discussion necessarily speaks in general terms. 
At one time, MNCs sought to internalize core resource or marketing 
constraints, but they have moved toward new strategies for maintaining market 
share in individual countries; one tactic for doing so is intra-firm trade.65  
Historically, these debates over MNCs have manifested as discussions about 
customs control regulation.66  Nations have historically maintained some 
control over the flow of goods across their borders through the use of customs, 
taxation rules, or individual tax assessments; customs duties can be a major 
revenue source, so they have remained an important source of control for 
countries with significant international trade.67  When tax administration is 
designed to make point-of-entry collection efficient, controls allow regulation 
of the flow of goods; however, over time, transfer pricing has come to 
represent a source of destabilization in such countries.68 
For the past three decades though, “a growing proportion of international 
trade is not really trade at all but transfers within single multinational 
corporations.”69  These transfers are “administered,” meaning that the prices 
assigned for accounting purposes are not usually set in the marketplace 
between two unrelated companies.70  That administered price may be different 
from transactions that were not conducted within an MNC for the simple 
reason that intra-firm or inter-company (transfer) pricing is the most important 
and complex variable in orchestrating marketing and production strategies.71 
Generally speaking, tax authorities tax firms based on the principles of 
taxation of entire worldwide income (for residents) and taxation of income 
 
 64. See id. at 7 (discussing how there can be numerous cultures within a society). 
 65. Sanjaya Lall, The Pattern of Intra-Firm Exports by U.S. Multinationals, 40 OXFORD 
BULL. ECON. & STAT. 209, 212 (1978) (comparing the reasons for undertaking vertical 
integration to those for undertaking intra-firm trade). 
 66. See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 63, at 39 (noting that customs duties are a major revenue 
source for countries); Lall, supra note 65, at 211 (noting that some studies do not differentiate 
among the underlying rationale for intra-firm trade). 
 67. See PETERS, supra note 63, at 39–40. 
 68. See G.K. Helleiner, Intrafirm Trade and the Developing Countries: An Assessment of the 
Data, 6 J. DEV. ECON. 391, 391–92 (1979) (stating that transfer pricing is of great concern to 
developing nations because it interferes with their ability to control the pricing flow of goods). 
 69. Robin Murray, Introduction to MULTINATIONALS BEYOND THE MARKET: INTRA-FIRM 
TRADE AND THE CONTROL OF TRANSFER PRICING 1, 2 (Robin Murray ed., 1981) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 70. Id. at 2–3.  See generally DAVID SOLOMONS, DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE: 
MEASUREMENT AND CONTROL 160–211 (2d prtg. 1969) (exploring interdivisional product and 
market relationships from various perspectives including theoretical). 
 71. WAGDY M. ABDALLAH, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES: DECISION-
MAKING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 29 (1989). 
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produced within the country (for residents and non-residents).72  Governments 
often treat corporations the same as other taxable entities.73  MNCs are 
therefore exposed to taxation on both sides, so they often establish separate 
legal entities in each tax jurisdiction.74  While MNCs might rely on bilateral 
taxation treaties between countries to provide rules that eliminate double 
taxation,75 they might also engage in tax management across regimes through 
the use of transfer pricing.76 
Stated corporate tax rates vary greatly across countries: In 2002, the rate 
was 24.5% in Switzerland, 40.0% in the United States, and 42.0% in Japan.77  
Of course, effective tax rates may differ from stated rates.78  Tax authorities 
want to make sure they get their “fair share” of MNC tax take,79 and they know 
that firms can use transfer pricing to minimize their overall tax burden 
(maximize profit).80  Of course, tax administrators have plenty of opportunities 
to address efficiency and efficacy through implementation.81  In the case of 
corporate taxation with regard to transfer pricing, “the actual meeting of 
taxpayer and tax official will determine what the law, in practice, is for that 
individual.”82  Authorities help to create a body of rulings that can be used to 
enforce tax legislation and specific statutes.83  One alternative to this system 
for MNCs is recourse to supranational arbitrations.84 
 
 72. Green, supra note 60, at 23. 
 73. See id. (noting that the definition of “person” under the Internal Revenue Code includes 
corporations and similar entities). 
 74. Masahiro Max Yoshimura, Comment, The “Tax War” Between the United States and 
Japan Under Internal Revenue Code § 482: Is There a Solution?, 12 WIS. INT’L L.J. 401, 406 
(1993–1994). 
 75. See Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, Do Bilateral Tax Treaties Promote Foreign 
Direct Investment?, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 461, 463 (Karl 
P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). 
 76. ABDALLAH, supra note 71, at 30. 
 77. KPMG INT’L, KPMG’S CORPORATE TAX RATE SURVEY: AN INTERNATIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE TAX RATES FROM 1993 TO 2006 13, 15 (2006). 
 78. See Don Fullerton, Which Effective Tax Rate?, 37 NAT’L TAX J. 23, 23–24 (1984). 
 79. John Neighbour, Transfer Pricing: Keeping it at Arm’s Length, OECD OBSERVER, Jan. 
2002, at 29, 30. 
 80. See ABDALLAH, supra note 71, at 29–30. 
 81. See PETERS, supra note 63, at 248 (stating that tax administrators can address the effects 
of tax laws in two ways: by issuing regulations and by taking entities with questionable liabilities 
to court). 
 82. Id. at 248–49. 
 83. Id. at 248. 
 84. COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRANSFER 
PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THREE TAXATION ISSUES 20 (1984) (outlining 
advantages and disadvantages to instituting an inter-governmental arbitration system for transfer 
pricing disputes). 
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In the situation discussed in this paper, transfer pricing is the pricing of 
goods and services within an MNC.  It occurs when part of a corporation in 
one country sells (transfers) goods or services to another part of the same 
corporation in another country.  The practice of transfer pricing and the 
procedures by which it is carried out affects how profits are allocated within a 
corporation for tax and other purposes.85  Essentially, transfer pricing attempts 
to allocate profits and losses for each division in a company in a way that will 
benefit the corporation’s overall strategy.86  For example, corporations also 
utilize transfer pricing to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of different 
divisions within the company; this aspect of transfer pricing is helpful for 
business decisions such as corporate expansion.87  As such, the two divisions 
of a hypothetical MNC can administer prices with several objectives in mind.  
The MNC has multiple objectives such as risk pooling, improving its domestic 
and international positions, exploring new markets, meeting tariff/quota 
restrictions in importing countries, securing otherwise unobtainable raw 
materials, exploring economic resources, manufacturing at lowest cost, and 
selling in the best markets.88 
Again, transfer pricing is the assignment of a non-market derived price, 
usually for accounting purposes, to internal transfers of goods, services, 
royalties, et cetera, within a firm.  In economics, the transfer of such goods 
within a corporation is still a trade.89  Internalization of such transfers helps 
avoid submarkets for inputs, pool risk from the unavailability of such inputs, 
and appropriate rents or profits that would have been otherwise inaccessible.90  
It is important to note here that transfer pricing is not solely a MNC practice.91  
Many domestic transfers within firms fall under a price-setting approach.92  
Transfer pricing includes practices that assign “manipulated prices on trade 
flows between units which have a common center of control (usually via a 
majority shareholding).”93 
A primary objective can be reducing the MNC’s overall international 
corporate income tax burden.  The firm can consolidate losses and profits and 
administer its overall tax burden.94  This happens because MNCs operate in 
 
 85. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 29. 
 86. Sakurai, supra note 61, at 176. 
 87. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 30. 
 88. See ABDALLAH, supra note 71, at 29–30 (outlining some of the financial concerns of 
MNCs). 
 89. Radaelli, supra note 57, at 605. 
 90. See ABDALLAH, supra note 71, at 29, 40–41. 
 91. Roger Y.W. Tang, Transfer Pricing in the 1990s: The Emphasis is on Multinational and 
Tax Issues, MGMT. ACCT., Feb. 1992, at 22, 24. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Murray, supra note 69, at 5. 
 94. Id. at 6. 
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numerous countries simultaneously, and their overall corporate tax burden 
varies across countries.95  It is often advantageous for MNCs to move profits 
into a country with low taxes.96  Since various parts of the corporation within 
different countries are under a common head of control, their profit allocation 
is not entirely the result of market forces when transfer pricing comes into 
play.97  A parent company can choose to pay one of its subsidiaries below-
market prices, so the subsidiary company looks like it has a lower profit.98  
Thus, there is the danger of affiliated companies within different countries 
over-pricing or under-pricing their internal imports/exports to evade taxes.99  
Within transfer pricing, firms must balance efficiency in generating profit and 
equity in distribution.100  Transfer pricing allows a company to avoid the 
problem of double taxation.101  If such trades were not internalized, that trade 
would be liable to taxation.102  The taxation must assess taxes on trades that are 
internal to the workings of a company, rather than internal to the market. 
Because MNCs use transfer pricing to achieve profitability and profit 
repatriation and avoid tax differentials, the right transfer price will help a 
company penetrate a market or establish a more global market position.103  It 
helps if there are markets for similar goods, but in practice MNCs distinguish 
between market, cost-oriented, and non-cost-oriented transfer prices.104  Of 
course, these factors are considered secondary or even ignored when the 
taxation authority attempts to determine the “correct” transfer price.105 
While evidence about transfer pricing remains spotty, a 1990 survey found 
that 132 out of 143 Fortune 500 firms used transfer pricing for domestic 
interdivisional transfers; 90 used transfer pricing for international transfers.106  
A survey of the heads of thirty-nine United States-based MNCs found that 
avoiding exchange controls was an important objective for a decision-
 
 95. Id. 
 96. ABDALLAH, supra note 71, at 30. 
 97. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 30. 
 98. See id. at 29 (describing an example where a British company shows a profit but its 
Korean supplier does not). 
 99. Id. at 29–30. 
 100. See id. at 29. 
 101. Id. at 30. 
 102. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 29–30. 
 103. See ROGER Y.W. TANG, TRANSFER PRICING PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
JAPAN 106–07 (1979); Lawson A.W. Hunter, Q.C. & Susan M. Hutton, Where There is a Will, 
There is a Way; Cooperation in Canada-U.S. Antitrust Relations, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 101, 110 
(1994). 
 104. TANG, supra note 103, at 2–3. 
 105. See Richard L. Kaplan, International Tax Enforcement and the Special Challenge of 
Transfer Pricing, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (explaining that as far as tax authorities go, 
“corporate pretensions about a global entity are simply beside the point”). 
 106. Tang, supra note 91, at 22, 24. 
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maker.107  Evidence about the practice also comes from MNCs based outside 
the United States.108  While Japanese firms often center their focus on growing 
market share over maximizing short-term profits, pricing management has 
become central to implementing that goal.109  However, a detailed survey of 
empirical research shows that the research has failed to suggest a single 
strategy for transfer pricing due to the diversity of companies’ needs.110 
How should they design their own regimes to increase their take?  To 
avoid tax avoidance and other transfer pricing problems, the OECD developed 
the “arm’s length principle,” which is found in Article 9 of the 1997 Model 
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital.111  The arm’s length principle 
states that instead of treating two company entities as part of a large corporate 
structure, transfer pricing should treat the two companies involved as two 
independent unrelated companies.112  Parties to the transaction are expected to 
be independent and on equal footing.113  The arm’s length principle asks 
corporations to find comparable market transactions so that they can set an 
acceptable transfer price.114  The purpose of arm’s length regulation is to 
prevent transfer price distortion.115  However, considerable regulatory 
uncertainty remains since countries, firms, and industries prefer different 
applications of the arm’s length principle.116 
Specifically, firms must choose one of a number of different ways of 
implementing the arm’s length principle, or at least something that 
approximates it.  The discussion of these decisions can naturally become 
technical since it describes methods of incorporating diverse allocable 
principles from economics, accounting, and law.  A short description of the 
range of decisions helps paint a picture of the layering of these choices for 
firms, tax authorities, and legal analysts.  For example, in October 1988, the 
Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) jointly released 
“A Study of Intercompany Pricing” (also known as the Section 482 White 
 
 107. SIDNEY M. ROBBINS & ROBERT B. STOBAUGH, MONEY IN THE MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISE: A STUDY OF FINANCIAL POLICY 17, 92 (Raymond Vernon ed., Harvard 
Multinational Enter. Ser., 1973). 
 108. See generally Kenneth A. Grossberg, The Ins and Outs of Japanese Pricing Strategy, J. 
PRICING MGMT., Summer 1990, at 6, 6 (discussing transfer pricing by Japanese MNCs). 
 109. See id. 
 110. TANG, supra note 103, at 21. 
 111. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 30. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. (using an example to say that transactions that allocate all the costs or all the 
profits to different divisions are problematic). 
 115. See id. (explaining that no country wants its tax base unfairly diminished by transfer 
pricing). 
 116. Neighbour, supra note 79, at 30. 
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Paper) to provide guidance about the proper allocation of income.117  The 
problem of deciding on a method came down, in many instances, to the “basic 
arm’s length return method” (BALRM).118  Debates about BALRM and its 
place as a method (as well as more broadly in international law) followed the 
release of the White Paper,119 but what is instructive about the events and the 
history that followed is how difficult it is to find a single method that works in 
all instances for all companies. 
The problem faced under systems like BALRM (the so-called “profit split” 
method) is determining: 
[W]hether uncontrolled taxpayers would have agreed to the same terms, given 
the actual circumstances under which the controlled taxpayers dealt. . . . 
[U]ncontrolled taxpayers are deemed to exercise sound business judgment on 
the basis of reasonable levels of experience . . . within the relevant industry 
and with full knowledge of the facts.120 
Within four years after BALRM, the IRS essentially used four methods for 
calculating the transfer price allowable under the arm’s length principle: a 
comparable uncontrolled price (a market price); a resale price (a selling price, 
less markup); a cost-plus price (the “unfinished” good or service, plus 
markup); and a fourth set of methods (which might include profit-split, 
reasonable rates of return, functional analysis, an IRS Section 482 audit, et 
cetera).121  This meant that in practice firms set transfer prices in four different 
ways: market-based approaches, negotiated prices, cost-based prices, and 
through the use of mathematical programming models.122 
The methods themselves add a layer of uncertainty.  While firms have 
increased use of arm’s length prices over cost-based approaches,123 and 
evidence shows that approaches like BALRM tend to explain historical 
prices,124 MNCs still tend to prefer methods like cost-plus or the resale 
 
 117. Daniel J. Frisch, The BALRM Approach to Transfer Pricing, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 261, 261 
(1989). 
 118. See id. 
 119. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 6–7 (2007) (arguing that once you stop looking 
for comparables, you are no longer engaged in an arm’s length method). 
 120. Alan W. Granwell & Kenneth Klein, “Objective” Tests of Transfer Pricing Prop. Regs. 
Require Subjective Determinations, 76 J. TAX’N 308, 308 (1992). 
 121. Susan C. Borkowski, Section 482, Revenue Procedure 91-22, and the Realities of 
Multinational Transfer Pricing, INT’L TAX J., Spring 1992, at 59, 60–61. 
 122. See id. at 60. 
 123. Tang, supra note 91, at 24. 
 124. See Jean-Thomas Bernard & Robert J. Weiner, Transfer Prices and the Excess Cost of 
Canadian Oil Imports: New Evidence on Bertrand Versus Rugman, 25 CAN. J. ECON. 22, 40 
(1992) (analyzing Canadian crude oil prices in light of multinational oil companies’ transfer-
pricing practices). 
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method.125  A majority of companies have found tools like BALRM difficult to 
apply in practice, and so they often resort to alternative methods to resolve 
disputed issues.126 
These are natural ways the choice of method adds to the regulatory 
uncertainty firms face.  In addition, there are four other types of uncertainty.  
First, the IRS must navigate an implementation environment for which 
Congress lays a groundwork that may not be entirely structured.  For example, 
in the case of a profits-based approach to transfers of tangible property, “The 
source of the Service’s authority to apply the commensurate with income 
standard to tangibles is not clear.”127  As such, in general, firms must interpret 
the taxation authority’s approach and how that approach fits into the bigger 
political picture. 
Second, the different trade frameworks value different approaches.  The 
position of the European Economic Community on transfer pricing is 
important, as is how that framework fits into broader frameworks such as those 
vetted by the OECD.128  Difficulties come when there are different prices, 
differences between national laws, and different procedures.129 
Third, taxation law does not move in lockstep with either international 
trade laws and policies or the economics of international trade and transfers.  
Notably, “[t]he nature of international trade has changed since Section 482 was 
adopted, and the tax law has not kept up with changes in economic reality.”130  
At the same time, international frameworks such as the OECD’s have come 
closer to interpretations of the arm’s length criterion that have been offered in 
the United States,131 although other countries have moved in other 
directions.132 
 
 125. Anita M. Benvignati, An Empirical Investigation of International Transfer Pricing by 
U.S. Manufacturing Firms, in MULTINATIONALS AND TRANSFER PRICING 193, 201–02 (Alan M. 
Rugman & Lorraine Eden eds., 1985). 
 126. Guenter Schindler & David Henderson, Intercorporate Transfer Pricing: 1985 Survey of 
Section 482 Audits, 29 TAX NOTES 1171, 1171 (1985). 
 127. Granwell & Klein, supra at note 120, at 314. 
 128. See JOHN ROBINSON, MULTINATIONALS AND POLITICAL CONTROL 9–10 (1983) 
(discussing the European Economic Community’s Code of Conduct in the early 1980s). 
 129. See COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL TAX 
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (CONDENSED VERSION) § 9 (2008) (discussing 
differences in domestic laws, with particular emphasis on the fact that some countries “treat 
partnerships as taxable units (sometimes even as companies) whereas other countries adopt what 
may be referred to as the fiscally transparent approach”). 
 130. Robert W. McGee, Intercompany Transfer Pricing Under Section 482, J. PRICING 
MGMT., Winter 1991, at 37, 39. 
 131. AVI-YONAH, supra note 119, at 7. 
 132. See Nathan Boidman, The Effect of the APA and Other U.S. Transfer-Pricing Initiatives 
in Canada and Other Countries, 44 TAX EXECUTIVE 254, 257–59 (1992) (reviewing transfer-
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Fourth, there is always debate within the professional tax community over 
the appropriate taxation scheme: on the treatment of intangibles,133 
comparables,134 source rules,135 methods for comparisons,136 analytic 
complexity,137 and subnational rules.138  The complexity of these opinions and 
their implementation create a fourth source of uncertainty. 
In summary, a taxation authority can adjust the declared taxable profits of 
associated companies if they think those profits have been distorted because of 
transactions with associated companies in other territories.  Two entities are 
associated in two simple cases: An enterprise directly or indirectly manages, 
controls, or provides capital to another; or, the same people directly or 
indirectly manage, control, or provide capital to both enterprises.139  The arm’s 
length principle treats different parts of a MNC as separate entities.140  The 
authority may rewrite the associated enterprises’ accounts if they do not show 
the true taxable profits occurring in that country. 
The firm has to find two unrelated companies that carry out comparable 
transactions in the open market and use the same price as that charged between 
them.  There are many methods for comparing the uncontrolled transactions 
between independent parties with the controlled transactions between 
associated parties.  Different countries have different preferences for one 
method over another.141  Different firms and industries (and even different 
divisions of the same firm) prefer different methods.142  This variety is a form 
 
pricing developments in Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom). 
 133. See, e.g., Barbara L. Rollinson & Rom P. Watson, The New Intercompany Pricing 
Regulations, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 225, 225 (1992) (discussing intangibles in transfer pricing). 
 134. See, e.g., Laurie J. Dicker & George N. Carlson, The Proposed Transfer Pricing 
Regulations: Comments and Concerns, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 233, 234–35 (1992) (questioning an 
earlier paper’s assumption that simple and complex comparables are easily categorized). 
 135. See, e.g., Dale W. Wickham & Charles J. Kerester, New Directions Needed for Solution 
of the International Transfer Pricing Tax Puzzle: Internationally Agreed Rules or Tax Warfare?, 
56 TAX NOTES 339, 342–43 (1992). 
 136. See, e.g., John Turro, Witnesses Criticize “Other” CPI At Hearing on Transfer Pricing 
Regs, 56 TAX NOTES 1244, 1244 (1992) (describing multiple witnesses at an IRS hearing 
disagreeing with the comparable profit interval as used in proposed section 482 regulations). 
 137. See, e.g., Ronald D. Marcuson, Lively Debate Marks First Section 482 Seminar, 54 TAX 
NOTES 856, 857 (1992) (discussing Richard Cooper’s use of applied quantitative analysis to 
question the adjustments required by section 482 regulations). 
 138. See, e.g., Granwell & Klein, supra note 120, at 315 (arguing that unless the United 
States’ trading partners come to the same consensus on how to deal with transfer pricing, debate 
and consequential double-taxation will only intensify). 
 139. See Neighbour, supra note 79, at 30 (posing a hypothetical of a French bicycle 
manufacturer and its subsidiary, a distributor in the Netherlands). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, at i. 
 142. See Tang, supra note 91, at 24. 
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of regulatory uncertainty: uncertainty as to whether decisions made now (based 
on a particular method) will produce the expected outcome later in time (when 
it may be evaluated using a different method). 
Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) help reduce this uncertainty.  An 
APA “determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set of 
criteria (e.g., method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical 
assumptions as to future events) for the determination of the transfer pricing 
for those transactions over a fixed period of time.”143  APAs clarify factual 
issues surrounding the proposed activities (not legal uncertainty).  They are 
efficient for resolving issues in one, two, or more countries simultaneously.  
Firms may obtain both favorable treatment and (at least) certainty of treatment. 
Governments attempt to address transfer pricing tax avoidance issues 
through policy adjustments that coordinate systematic tax discrepancies across 
countries.144  As outlined above, APAs are written agreements between a firm 
and a tax authority that select a way to resolve transfer pricing issues in 
advance of the transaction occurring.145  The APA selects the pricing methods 
that will establish the arm’s length prices in future transactions.  Under the 
APA, pricing sources are classified as independent transactions, comparable 
transactions, or similar transactions.146  A unilateral APA involves one tax 
authority and a taxpayer; a bilateral or multilateral APA involves two or more 
tax authorities.147  Of course, unilateral APAs place the taxpayer at risk of 
transfer pricing risk in the other country since it only applies to one country. 
Advantages of APAs include better prediction of costs and tax liability, 
increased certainty in international tax issues, potentially reduced audit 
costs,148 and reduced risk of double taxation and litigation.149  However, APAs 
can be expensive and time consuming because of documentation requirements, 
pre-filing conferences, and fees.150  Along with this comes the inevitable 
change in how the MNC would do business without considering any transfer 
pricing implications. 
 
 143. CTR. FOR TAX POLICY & ADMIN., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MANUAL 
ON EFFECTIVE MUTUAL AGREEMENT PROCEDURES 48 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
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 145. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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June 1992, at 58, 59. 
 147. CTR. FOR TAX POLICY & ADMIN, supra note 143, at 48. 
 148. Id. at 43. 
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For instance, consider the effects of domestic tax policies under a bilateral 
APA on a MNC’s production decisions: While bilateral APAs prohibit income 
shifting, there is still the inefficiency of distorted production.151  With this kind 
of APA, the MNC and two governments agree on the same arm’s length 
price.152  Given this price and tax rates, the MNC maximizes its after-tax 
profits.153  But two governments that share a tax base still face a coordination 
problem, which leads to a level of inefficiency.154  In this case, the MNC must 
choose between this inefficiency and eliminating the segmentation between 
parts of the firm and internalizing the cost of the intra-firm transaction.  
Essentially, “[r]educing . . . uncertainty may require negotiated contracts where 
price, volume, and terms of trade are defined.”155  Firms necessarily compare 
these negotiated relationships with the choice of internal production within a 
single country. 
Overall, the purpose of APAs is to reduce a kind of regulatory uncertainty 
that flows in the environment in which MNCs do business.  In this 
environment, transactions within a single firm that occur across international 
borders require the construction of artificial prices so that tax authorities can 
allocate profit to different parts of the company.  In general, the construction of 
these prices creates uncertainty for firms—unless firms can anticipate the way 
in which those prices will be decided.  APAs provide a measure of certainty, 
because they reduce the future impact of regulation (in the form of tax 
judgments) by deciding on methods and procedures in advance of financial 
transactions.  The next question is why some countries have decided to allow 
APAs while others have not.  Answering that question is the purpose of the 
next section of this paper. 
III.  SIX EXPLANATIONS FOR WHEN COUNTRIES ALLOW APAS 
Quantitative statistical research about whether and why countries adopt 
policies governing these types of firm decisions is notably scarce.  To date, no 
statistical analysis of the rules governing the taxation of transfer pricing has 
been completed.  My data are drawn from how the OECD categorizes various 
rules governing transfer pricing.  APAs are agreements about the correct 
pricing of goods and services before the firm chooses to transfer them across 
national borders but within the framework of the overall multinational firm.  
My core hypothesis in this study is that the adoption of such rules, which are 
not uniform across countries (or even within the OECD), depends on 
 
 151. See Tomohara, supra note 144, at 871. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 869. 
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countries’ relative placement in the network of activity by MNCs and how the 
state commits itself to limiting the role of the state in the activities of the 
market.  Together with a set of tests of alternative hypotheses, including the 
broad regulatory regime, the structure of corporate tax rates, the national 
dependence on corporate taxation, and the impact of the OECD, this analysis 
shows that the reduction of regulatory uncertainty within the tax code is a 
function of the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into and out of the 
country, along with the country’s corporate income tax rate.  This has strong 
implications for the long-term performance of countries in markets marked by 
the presence of multinational firms, as well as the tax performance of countries 
competing in the global marketplace. 
In this section, I describe the variables collected for the countries included 
in this study.  In this study, I looked at variables that could affect (directly or 
indirectly) the chance that a country adopts an APA regime.  My data include 
evidence from forty-seven countries representing a wide variety of geographic, 
social, and development attributes.156 
My choice of 2005 data for adoption of an APA regime is dictated by data 
availability for my other variables to ensure the causal sequencing of 
dependent and independent variables.  The main question here is why do some 
nations allow APAs, while others do not?  The data are on the existence of 
formal rules allowing and governing the negotiation of APAs.  These data are 
obtained from a report produced by the consultancy KPMG in 2005.157  
Consultancies like KPMG produce documents like the Global Transfer Pricing 
Review to aid MNCs as they attempt to understand changes in transfer pricing 
legislation that occur around the world.158  The consultancy’s Global Transfer 
Pricing Services unit compiled data from an array of professionals employed in 
the analysis of transfer pricing.159  The purpose of the review is to describe 
requirements for transfer pricing compliance in a wide array of countries.160  
There are forty-seven countries included in the overall analysis.161  This 
includes countries from the OECD, but also extends outside that select list to 
include countries from Asia and Latin America.162  Table A2, infra, shows the 
full list of countries included from that document for the statistical analysis 
presented below. 
 
 156. See Table A2 in Appendix A. 
 157. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, supra note 20, at 2.  Any country that KPMG 
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Of course, the purpose of the KPMG report is to relay a specific 
consultancy’s expertise to a set of potential clients.  KPMG sells the services 
of over 600 professionals and their information, access, expertise, and analysis 
for MNCs who are attempting to solve specific transfer pricing problems or to 
develop broader strategies for investment.163  Such tactics require participation 
by professionals from diverse fields, including economists, tax advisors, and 
financial analysts.164  As KPMG notes, they use “knowledge of local rules and 
how they interact to help member firm clients find tax-efficient pricing routes 
through an increasingly complex international web of transfer pricing rules.”165  
A wide array of other consultancies also provide such data, including 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, who note, “A major and growing problem for the 
directors of multinationals is the issue of preparing documentation to 
demonstrate compliance with transfer pricing rules.”166  While there are 
potential problems with the use of data from consultancies, such as errors of 
omission, these data are the best available because they cover a much wider 
range than those often provided by international organizations like the OECD. 
In the data, 22 out of 46 countries surveyed had APAs.167  Recall that 
countries with APAs have made significant efforts to reduce the uncertainty of 
firms about the handling of multinational movements of goods, services and 
profits.  Three example countries with APA provisions are Belgium, Mexico, 
and Taiwan; countries without English legal origins include Finland, Malaysia, 
and Romania.168 
While a full discussion of the statistical approaches used here is beyond the 
scope of this paper, certain details about the data and the implications for our 
inferences are important for understanding the nature of the analysis that 
follows.  First, in statistical terms, this is a fairly small dataset.  The countries 
that have APA provisions have an advantage because there, the adoption of an 
APA is common.  However, the size of the dataset can be a concern for 
statistical analysis.169  Second, the traditional approach here is to assess the 
impact of the explanations detailed below by a technique built for “either/or” 
outcomes called “logit.”170  This approach can often perform poorly in the case 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, at ii. 
 167. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, supra note 20, at 3–16. 
 168. Id.  As of the date of data collection, Malaysia was considering adopting some 
regulations, but lacked experience in APA formation.  Id. at 9–10.  Additionally, Finland and 
Romania have a heavily-qualified process similar to the APAs, but not named as such.  Id. at 5–6, 
11–12. 
 169. J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 53 (Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Soc. Scis. Ser. No. 7, 1997). 
 170. See id. at 51. 
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of small datasets, so it is important to assess the overall impact of the analysis 
tool on the inferences being drawn.171  Third, I account for limitations in my 
sample and the limited nature of my dependent variable by first estimating a 
logit model, and then assessing the model’s robustness using a trimming 
estimator for the linear probability model.172  Together, these issues may 
impact some of the key inferences being drawn below.  I next turn to a 
discussion of the six explanations explored in this paper for whether countries 
have APA provisions. 
A. Legal Development 
The first explanation I explore centers on the country’s broad legal 
development path.  My measure of this development path is a dummy variable 
for the origin of a country’s legal system.  English origin dummies are 
generated to reflect legal attributes such as judicial vs. legislative precedent, 
rights to private property, and the general rights of the individual relative to the 
state.  In general English legal systems are coded as “1” for former colonies, 
and all others are coded as “0.”  Studies of the impact of English legal origins 
suggest that those systems are more likely to protect the rights of capital and to 
reduce regulatory uncertainty about expropriation of market rents.173  Three 
example countries with English origins are Australia, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom; countries without English legal origins include Argentina, Finland, 
and Venezuela.174 
Are countries with English legal origins more likely to adopt APAs?  In the 
KPMG data analyzed here, 34 countries do not have English origins; 17 of 
those countries also allow APAs.175  Twelve countries have English origins; 5 
of those also allow APAs.176  At a rough glance there seems to be little 
evidence that English legal origins affect whether a given country will adopt an 
APA provision. 
B. Corporate Tax Rates 
The second explanation centers on the impact of corporate tax rates.  My 
measure of corporate tax rates is the percentage tax rate, as constructed by 
 
 171. See id. at 34–35 (discussing the varieties of studies that look at binary dependant 
variables and reviewing four different methods of conducting statistical analysis under those 
circumstances). 
 172. See generally Horrace & Oaxaca, supra note 21 (discussing limitations of linear 
probability models and how to account for such problems, including use of a trimmed sample 
estimator). 
 173. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 22, at 1131–32, 1137–39; La Porta et al., 
Quality of Government, supra note 22, at 261–62. 
 174. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 22, at 1138. 
 175. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, supra note 20, at 3–16. 
 176. Id. 
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KPMG.177  Specifically, tax rates are measured on a scale of 0 to 100, as 
measured in January 2002; the lowest rate in the data is 16, and the highest is 
42.178  The three countries with the highest corporate tax rates in the data are 
Sri Lanka, Japan, and Italy; the countries in the data with the lowest corporate 
tax rates are Chile, Ireland, and Hong Kong.179  There is some evidence that 
countries compete with one another over corporate tax rates.180 
Are countries with higher corporate tax rates more likely to adopt APAs?  
Figure 1, infra, shows two boxes that represent the distributions of the tax rates 
for the two groups of countries: those that have APAs and those that do not.  
The middle line of each represents the median tax rate for countries in that 
group; the left and right lines represent (respectively) the lowest and highest 
tax rates in that group.  These side-by-side “box plots” show that, on average, 
countries with higher corporate tax rates are more likely to have adopted 
APAs.  This presents a measure of evidence about this explanation, but the 
statistical analysis below will show whether this evidence holds up once we 
have accounted for the other five explanations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Corporate Tax Rate 
 
 177. KPMG INT’L, supra note 77, at 13, 15. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Michael P. Devereux et al., Do Countries Compete Over Corporate Tax Rates?, 92 J. 
PUB. ECON. 1210, 1231 (2008).  See also KPMG INT’L, supra note 77, at 4. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
292 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:269 
C. Tax Dependence 
The third explanation centers on the impact of tax dependence: the degree 
to which the central government depends on corporate taxes to fulfill 
budgetary obligations.  My measure of corporate tax dependence is the 
percentage of all government revenue for the central government that is due to 
taxes on corporations and other enterprises, as constructed by the International 
Monetary Fund.181  Specifically, corporate tax dependence was measured in 
2002; the data for dependence are highly skewed, which can complicate 
estimation of the statistical model below, so I computed a zero-skewness log 
transformation of the underlying variable.182  The three countries in the KPMG 
report with the greatest corporate tax dependence in the data are Malaysia, 
Colombia, and Venezuela; the three countries with the lowest dependence on 
corporate taxes are Singapore, Chile, and Mexico.183  There is some evidence 
that countries change their development of rule packages for managing the 
economy based on their dependence on specific revenue streams, such as those 
from corporations.184 
Are countries with greater dependence on corporate taxes more likely to 
adopt APAs?  Like Figure 1, Figure 2, infra, shows two boxes that represent 
distributions for those countries that have APAs and those that do not; in this 
case, the distributions are for the measure of tax dependence for the two groups 
of countries.  As above, the middle line of each represents the median 
dependence level rate for countries in each group; the left and right lines 
represent the lowest and highest tax dependence levels in each group.  The 
side-by-side box plots reveal no differences between countries with different 
corporate tax dependence levels.  Countries with high levels do not appear 
more likely to have adopted APAs.  Again, the statistical analysis below will 
show whether this pattern continues once we have accounted for the other five 
explanations. 
  
 
 181. See generally 26 INT’L. MONETARY FUND, GOVERNMENT FINANCE STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK (2002) (compiling international financial data, including total revenue, tax revenue, 
and corporate taxes for each country in Table A2). 
 182. See G.E.P. Box & D.R. Cox, An Analysis of Transformations, 26 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y, 
SERIES B 211, 213 (1964) (discussing statistical issues with a dependant variable prone to 
transformation). 
 183. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 181, at 95, 103, 267, 280, 378, 462. 
 184. See Duane Swank, Politics and the Structural Dependence of the State in Democratic 
Capitalist Nations, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 38, 50 (1992) (discussing the structural dependence 
thesis, which says that the “the social and economic policies of all governments are 
fundamentally conditioned by their dependence on the willingness of capitalists to continue to 
invest”). 
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Figure 2.  Tax Dependence 
D. Foreign Direct Investment 
The fourth and fifth explanations center on the degree to which the 
country’s economy is embedded in a network of activity by MNCs.  There are 
two primary explanations here.  The first is that incoming flows of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) increase the chance that a country will adopt APA 
provisions.  The second is that outbound flows of FDI increase the likelihood 
that a country will adopt APA provisions.  In the first case, FDI represents the 
benefits brought by MNCs to a country; APAs are a way of sustaining inbound 
FDI flows.  In the second case, outbound FDI measures the network effects of 
MNCs located within a country; APAs are a way of sustaining those MNCs, 
and also of increasing the chances that those MNCs will repatriate profits from 
another country.  Theories in the study of network economics indicate that 
rules like APAs sustain or dampen the likelihood of interactions in networks 
like those defined by MNCs operating across national borders.185  A number of 
important studies have shown the relationships between FDI and taxation 
levels or policies generally.186  Are countries with greater inward-bound FDI 
 
 185. See ANNA NAGURNEY & STAVROS SIOKOS, FINANCIAL NETWORKS: STATICS AND 
DYNAMICS 4–5 (Advances in Spatial Sci. Ser., 1997) (describing network theory as applied to 
economics and noting that such tools can be useful in examining individual factors). 
 186. Mihir A. Desai et al., Foreign Direct Investment in a World of Multiple Taxes, 88 J. PUB. 
ECON. 2727, 2729–30 (2004). 
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flows more likely to adopt APAs?  Are countries with greater outward-bound 
FDI flows more likely to adopt APAs? 
My first measure of FDI flows is the size of inbound FDI in a nation, as 
obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).187  My second measure of flows is the size of outbound FDI, also 
obtained from UNCTAD.188  Both inflow and outflow are measured originally 
in millions of dollars per annum, for the year 2002.  Because the measures are 
both skewed, I again calculated a zero-skewness log transformation.  The three 
countries with the greatest inward FDI in the data are the United States, 
Germany, and China; the countries in the data with the lowest inward FDI are 
Greece, Iceland, and Sri Lanka.189  For outward FDI flows, the three countries 
with the greatest in the data are the United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom; the countries in the data with the lowest outward FDI are Argentina, 
South Africa, and Portugal.190 
Are countries with greater inward-bound FDI flows more likely to adopt 
APAs than countries with lower inward-bound flows?  Are countries with 
greater outward-bound FDI flows more likely to adopt?  Figure 3, infra, shows 
box plots for inward flows, while Figure 4 shows plots for outward flows.  
Figure 3 suggests that countries with higher inward flows are more likely to 
adopt APAs; Figure 4, infra, suggests the same for countries with higher 
outward flows.  The analysis below will test the robustness of this initial 
finding. 
  
 
 187. Foreign Direct Investment Database, UNCTADSTAT (Sept. 17, 2010, 2:08 PM), 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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Figure 3.  Inward FDI Flows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Outward FDI Flows 
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D. OECD Membership 
Finally, I account for OECD membership of the countries under study 
here.  Are OECD countries more likely to adopt APAs?  The data show that 7 
out of 17 states that are not OECD members also allow APAs.  Fifteen out of 
29 states that are OECD members also allow APAs.  As in the case of English 
legal origins, the data at this point do not point to a specific effect of OECD 
membership, even though (as noted above) the OECD contributed important 
model rules for the treatment of transfer pricing and the choice to use APAs to 
mitigate regulatory uncertainty. 
Descriptive statistics for all measures are located in Appendix A in Table 
A1.  The list of included countries is in Table A2 in Appendix A. 
IV.  RESULTS 
Table 1, in Appendix A, shows the results from my estimation of the three 
different models’ equations, one each for the different ways of understanding 
and assessing the evidence represented in the data.  The fit statistics indicate 
that we should accept the models as explaining more than would a naïve guess 
about whether a country has or does not have APA provisions.  The R2 statistic 
serves as an imperfect descriptor of the percent of variance explained by the 
predictors, but there is moderate explanatory power in each of the three 
models. 
The first important finding is that neither English legal origins nor 
dependence on corporate taxes appears to be a significant predictor of the 
incidence of APAs.  The coefficient for English legal origins is not significant 
at conventional levels in any of the three equations, nor is the coefficient for 
corporate tax dependence.  This is instructive: while the studies recounted 
above have found varying levels of association between English legal origins 
and the reduction of economic uncertainty, my analysis, using a very specific 
measure of uncertainty reduction in the form of APAs, finds no association.  
Similarly, while studies find varying associations between corporate tax 
dependence and other tax rules, my study finds no connection.  Simple reasons 
for this difference are that other scholars have concentrated on single country 
studies, studies of only industrialized countries, or studies of very specific 
outcomes.  In this sense, other studies are bound in their findings by sampling 
choices, either for units of analysis or for choice of dependent variables.  My 
findings indicate no clear support for a direct role for English legal origins in 
this case. 
In contrast, I find a remarkable pattern of relationships between FDI flows 
and the incidence of APAs.  First, I find that inward FDI flows are associated 
with greater incidence of APAs.  Second, I find that outward FDI flows are 
associated with greater incidence of APAs.  Figure 5, infra, shows the 
estimated response function for changes in the likelihood that a country has 
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adopted APAs based on changes in inward-bound flows of FDI.  Figure 6, 
infra, shows the estimated likelihood that a country has adopted APAs based 
on changes in outward-bound flows.  In a nutshell, the figures show that even 
though inward-bound flows have a strong effect on the chance a country has 
adopted APAs, the effect of inward-bound FDI is still not strong enough to 
push a country across the threshold—to move it from not having an APA to 
having an APA provision.  This is shown because the estimated probability 
(shown on the left side of the figure) never exceeds 0.50.  In contrast, outward-
bound flows increase the chance that a given country will adopt APAs from 
less than 0.20 (when FDI flows are low) to over 0.80 (when FDI flows are their 
highest).  This means that the countries that are most likely to adopt APAs are 
those whose native MNCs make significant investments in other countries’ 
economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Effect of FDI Flows (Inward) on the  
Probability of Having an APA Provision. 
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Figure 6.  Effect of FDI Flows (Outward) 
on the Probability of Having an APA Provision 
I also find that corporate tax rates are positively related to the incidence of 
APAs, which indicates that higher tax rates translate into greater reduction of 
regulatory uncertainty.  Figure 7, infra, shows that corporate tax rates increase 
the chance that a given country will adopt APAs from around 0.20 (when rates 
are low) to over 0.70 (when corporate tax rates are their highest).  This means 
that the countries that are most likely to adopt APAs are those whose tax rates 
are high, so the rates increase the likelihood that a measure of protection will 
be provided to MNCs and other companies who may fear regulatory 
uncertainty that comes with the transfer pricing process. 
  
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] THE REDUCTION OF REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY 299 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Effect of Corporate Tax Rate on the  
Probability of Having an APA Provision 
My last set of findings represent a mixture of intuitive and counterintuitive 
results.191  I first find that OECD status reduces the likelihood that a country 
will have an APA regime; this goes against the presumption that the OECD’s 
production of model policy for transfer pricing increases the chances that its 
members will have adopted it.  However, this finding is not robust.  The last 
column, which includes the trimming estimator, shows that once we account 
for potential problems with the statistical analysis, the estimated negative 
effect of OECD status disappears.  However, all of the other estimated 
relationships are robust to this choice.  The intuitive result here is that OECD 
status is at best neutral on the likelihood a given country will have adopted 
APA provisions. 
In summary, there is strong evidence that countries with high FDI outflows 
are more likely to adopt (by a lot); weaker evidence that countries with high 
corporate tax rates are more likely to adopt (but a little less); and weak 
evidence that countries with high FDI inflows are more likely to adopt (but not 
by much).  How good is the prediction model for explaining why specific 
countries choose to adopt APA provisions?  In fact, the model misses a few 
countries.  For example, the model predicts the following countries will have 
APA provisions: Finland, India, Russia, Singapore, and Sweden.  Those 
 
 191. See supra Table 1. 
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countries did not allow APAs at the time KPMG gathered the data in 2005.192  
The following countries should not have the APA if the inferences above hold 
true, but KPMG recorded that they do: Australia, Peru, Slovakia, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and Venezuela.193 
Two example countries that the prediction model really misses are Sweden 
and Thailand.  Sweden did not have APA provisions at the time of the data 
collection.194  It does not have English legal origins.195  Its corporate tax rate is 
lower than average, as is its dependency on corporate taxes.196  It is a member 
of the OECD.  However, its FDI inflows and outflows are both higher than 
average.  What compensates for high FDI inflows and still fairly high 
corporate tax rates in the case of Sweden?  The answer is data.  Recall that the 
data here are from 2005, although time has moved forward since that period.  
In fact, in 2009, Sweden’s government moved forward to allow for APAs, and 
those APA provisions are now in force.197  Essentially, the model predicted 
that Sweden should have APAs; although it did not allow for them by 2005, 
the model’s prediction still held.  The data “caught up” with the prediction. 
In contrast, Thailand has an APA provision.198  It has English legal 
origins.199  Its corporate tax rate is lower than average, although its dependency 
on corporate taxes is higher than average.200  It is not a member of the OECD.  
Its FDI flows (in and out) are both lower than average.  In Thailand, what 
compensates for low FDI inflows?  A preliminary explanation is that Thailand 
had APAs in name only.  While Thailand adopted APA provisions in 2002, 
they were not enforced until May 2010.201  Essentially, the model predicted 
that Thailand should not have had APAs, and in effect, Thailand did not have 
APAs.  Of course, one feature of statistical analysis is the quality of data, and 
in this case, the coarse “has/does not have” distinction does not account for 
 
 192. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, supra note 20, at 3–16. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 13–14. 
 195. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 22, at 1138. 
 196. KPMG INT’L, supra note 77, at 15. 
 197. Advance Pricing Agreement: New Bill, KPMG.SE (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.kpmg.se/ 
pages/108914.html. 
 198. GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SERVICES, supra note 20, at 13–14. 
 199. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 22, at 1138. 
 200. KPMG INT’L, supra note 77, at 15. 
 201. PORNAPA L. THAICHAROEN & PANYA SITTISAKONSIN, BAKER & MCKENZIE, 2003 ASIA 
PACIFIC TAX UPDATE: THAILAND (2003), available at http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/ 
EDB7F45C-3141-4CB8-9291-53E81180654D/33074/2003ThailandTaxUpdate.pdf (noting that 
Thai revenue pricing guidelines are not being strictly enforced as of 2003); Thailand: Revenue 
Department Issues Guidance on APA Process, KPMG (May 17, 2010), http://www.us.kpmg.com/ 
microsite/taxnewsflash/tp/2010/TNFTP10_29Thailand.html (noting that the Thai Revenue 
Department was promoting APAs as of April 2010). 
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differences in enforcement.  Indeed, any of the countries represented in this 
paper as having APA provisions may in fact enforce them in a variety of ways. 
The general point here is that this type of prediction model is a useful 
starting point for training research sights on different countries’ systems.  As 
this exercise indicates, two countries that the model does not correctly predict 
should receive greater empirical attention.  Knowing why Sweden delayed 
adoption or Thailand rushed it, are useful ways of moving our knowledge of 
legal innovation forward. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper focuses on the conditions under which governments seek to 
reduce regulatory uncertainty and regulatory risk.  This paper concentrates on 
MNCs that seek to transfer goods and services across international borders.  
Multidivisional firms often use pricing systems for the transfer of such goods 
and services.  The use of transfer pricing as a coordination mechanism can be 
problematic when divisions engage in cross-border transactions if governments 
regulate the flow of taxable revenue across borders.  The typical standard is 
whether the price is consistent with an “arms length” transaction. 
I address the conditions under which countries adopt APAs that allow for 
agreements between a taxpayer and the tax authority that a range of prices will 
be recognized as “arm’s length.”  The statistical model in this paper assesses 
this choice using data from 2005 about whether a country’s tax authority is 
authorized to negotiate binding APAs.  Both inward and outward FDI flows 
increase the likelihood of a country adopting an APA and, thus, reducing 
regulatory uncertainty.  However, the impact of FDI flows out of the country is 
substantially greater than those into the country.  Countries are more likely to 
reduce regulatory uncertainty by adopting an APA mechanism when they have 
high corporate tax rates; the impact of corporate tax rates is also substantially 
higher than that for inward FDI flows. 
Two themes warrant emphasis.  First, the use of this kind of prediction 
model supplements a broad literature that concentrates on the details of these 
proposals.  Those approaches are like the use of microscopes, whereas this 
approach is like cartography.  The usefulness of the approach shown in this 
paper is that it concentrates investigatory resources on useful and interesting 
cases that might have escaped targeting in the past.  In the current paper, 
Sweden and Thailand emerge as useful cases for additional “microscopic” 
investigation. 
Second, this paper returns our attention to the issue of regulatory 
uncertainty.  This topic has received almost cursory treatment in academic 
literature, while it has spawned entire consultative careers for those who can 
help firms understand and respond to changes in regulation that occur across 
countries and time.  Tax treatment of business processes like transfer pricing 
falls into this category, although as a field, taxation policy remains distant from 
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more traditional studies of regulation like those of antitrust and market 
concentration.  Regardless, regulatory uncertainty remains a concern, and 
transfer pricing grows as a component of those views. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1: Models of Reduction of Regulatory Uncertainty 
 
 
 
* indicates significance at better than 0.10 (two-tailed test). 
** indicates significance at better than 0.05 (two-tailed test). 
*** indicates significance at better than 0.01 (two-tailed test). 
 Logit   OLS   Trimmed   
Variable Est. SE  Est. SE  Est. SE  
English  
Origins -1.108 0.939 
 
-0.174 0.154 
 
-0.180 0.168 
 
Corporate  
Tax Rate 0.091 0.053 
** 
0.015 0.009 
* 
0.016 0.010 
* 
Dependence -0.031 0.038  -0.006 0.007  -0.006 0.008  
OECD -1.453 1.010 * -0.230 0.181  -0.248 0.194  
FDI:  
Inward 0.841 0.301 
*** 
0.130 0.048 
*** 
0.145 0.056 
*** 
FDI:  
Outward 0.436 0.313 
* 
0.084 0.057 
* 
0.083 0.060 
* 
Constant -11.962 3.212 *** -1.497 0.368 *** -1.660 0.518 *** 
N 46   46   41   
RMSE    0.433   0.463   
Wald 2/F 17.61 **  10.79 ***  5.02 ***  
Pseudo-R2/R2 0.31   0.36   0.28   
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
APA 0.478 0.505 
English Origins 0.261 0.443 
Corporate Tax Rate 31.075 6.481 
Dependence 14.962 8.938 
OECD 0.630 0.488 
FDI: Inward 8.576 1.404 
FDI: Outward 8.179 1.628 
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Table A3: Included Countries 
 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Malaysia 
 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Venezuela 
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